This paper aims to investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in China for both short-term and long-term, with a special attention to the period of financial turbulence bursted in the summer of 2007. On one side, we employ a two regime threshold autoregressive model to study the Renminbi yield differential between the onshore interest rate and the offshore Non Deliverable Forward-implied one for the period of 2006-2009; on the other side, we distinguish (and measure) the short-term cross-border capital flows from the long-term flows for a long horizon. Based on obtained evidence, we found the capital controls in China less effective, nevertheless, still working for some goals of Chinese government under a more opened capital accounts.
Introduction
When the recovery is surprisingly brisk and global growth appears increasingly robust, the pace of growth in European countries tend to be slow partly due to the lack of effective policy stimulus. As the fears of sovereign debts spread beyond Greece and unleash more attacks on financial markets, gradually tightened fiscal policy and extended period of cheap Euro seem desirable for the rich group. Consequently, this encourages more capital to flow to emerging economies for searching higher yield, like China whose economy is now growing at double-digit rate.
However, even the most dynamic economy in the world suffered in 2009, resulting in temporary interruption of breakneck growth. This was also the case for others East Asian countries, who had hoped that they were somehow far from the financial turmoil largely confined to the rich countries, however found themselves beaten even harder than anywhere in the planet. Indeed, both the scale and speed of that downturn are breathtaking, with a so broader scope than that of the regional financial crisis a decade ago. At that time, China's relatively closed capital accounts have been considered by some commentators as an important element in its success in maintaining its commitment to a stable exchange rate (IMF, 2000) , and in preventing it from suffering harmful effects. Twelve years later, when most European countries still lived in recession triggered by the financial turbulence, it is China and developing countries of the East Asia-Pacific region who first recover from the global crisis, and it would be also them who can grow rapidly in the next decade even in a weakened world.
Nevertheless, there is a great urgency in controlling capital inflows (or hot monies) to avoid the eventual overheating and bubble forming, after the fiscal and monetary stimulus effectively implemented during the turbulence period in these economies. In this circumstance, it is interesting to know how did China cope with this financial turmoil and the economic slowdown which comes to its heel. Did its capital control policy work magically again, allowing China a quick recovering from its deepest slump in almost a decade and keeping it continue to be the economic locomotive of the gloomy world?
This paper aims to investigate the effectiveness of capital controls in China for both shortterm and long-term, with a special attention to the period of financial turbulence bursted in the summer of 2007. On one side, we employ a two regime threshold autoregressive model to study the Renminbi yield differential between the onshore interest rate and the offshore Non Deliverable Forward-implied one for the period of 2006-2009; on the other side, we distinguish (and measure) the short-term cross-border capital flows from the long-term flows for a long horizon. Based on obtained evidence, we found the capital controls in China less effective, nevertheless, still working for some goals of Chinese government under a more opened capital accounts.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, after briefly reminding the purposes and summarizing the existing classifications of capital controls, we characterize those implemented in China and present their mechanisms; The evolution of China's capital controls is introduced in section 3; Section 4 presents the empirical methodology and evidence obtained via the covered interest rate parity; In section 5 we complement with evidence from capital movements by discerning the cross-border capital flows of different maturities; The last section concludes.
2 Why and How to implement capital controls?
The purposes of capital controls
Capital control is one of the monetary policy devices for a country whose government uses it to restrict the movement of capital across that country's borders. The purposes of this measure are various and vary with time and place. 1 In a world where the market economy dominates, despite all its costs and certain negative effects, controls are adopted preferably to avoid the dangers generated by the free mobility of international capital. 2 For China, a planned economy since the establishment of the new Republic and currently transforming into a market economy, cross-border capital flows were completely banned before economic opening initiated 1978 whereas the characteristics of centralized economy. This form of control, usually seen in a planned economy, aimed to impose a full constraint on the domestic resources without worrying about all external shocks and volatility. In general, this control system has functioned more or less well with respect to its designated roles (Zhang, 2006) . During the process of transformation into market economy, Chinese authorities have planned to open capital accounts in the medium run(although the exact date is not revealed). 3 However, the restrictions on capital flows have still persisted in certain forms, based on following reasons: to promote the process of restructuring the national economy, to protect the national economy sectors (especially the public ones) and underdeveloped national banking system from international competition, to protect the domestic economy from the impact of the misallocation of resources, and to ensure financial stability. Moreover, certain implicit aims should also be taken into account: accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, maintaining exchange rate stability of RMB (add one footnoot ?).
The styles of capital controls
Restrictions on cross-border capital movements in capital accounts of China adhere to a system called "Foreign Exchange management". The first official appearance of the term "foreign exchange in capital accounts" was in the "Regulations on the Foreign Exchange System of the People's Republic of China" promulgated in 1996. 4 Since the explicit implementation of controls in the capital accounts, China generally welcomes long-run capital inflow more than that of short term, with the goal that regulates the volatility of capital flows rather than its volumes. Before presenting the working mechanism of capital controls 1 For a summary of purposes, methods used, control directions, examples of capital controls, see Neely (1999) . 2 For a recent review of capital account liberalization, see Henry (2007) . 3 "Provided that risks can be effectively guarded off, we should selectively, and in steps, deregulate restrictions on cross-border capital transactions and gradually establish Renminbi's (Chinese currency, hereafter RMB) convertibility on the capital account" has been declared by Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party October 21, 2003 . It was the first time that China referred to the convertibility of its currency in the capital accounts as an official purpose. 4 Last time revised in August 2008.
in China, it is necessary to distinguish several styles of them and to specify those adopted by the Chinese government.
There are four main classifications in the literature for the styles of capital controls.
Based on method of control, the first distinguishes direct or administrative controls from indirect or market-based ones (IMF, 2000) . The second classification is grounded on the direction of the controls (or direction of flows), two types of controls being treated in the literature: controls on capital outflows, similar to those that Malaysia imposed in mid-1998, and controls on capital inflows, similar to those implemented in Chile between 1991 and 1998. This distinction was proposed in the background when the discussion about the new international financial architecture focuses on these two types of control (Edwards, 1999 ).
More recently, Anderson (2006) distinguishes targeted restrictions from generalized ones, which is the third classification based on range of controls. The former aims to slow down the entry and exit of short term portfolio investment funds during the periods of short-term shocks, often used in economies that has already opened to the flows of portfolio investment capital; while the latter aim to restrict almost all transactions relevant to foreign capital, that we saw in Eastern Asian and Latin American countries before the 80s and also in transition economies like China. Finally, the fourth classification is based on the maturity of capital flows: controls on the long term foreign capital flows or on the short term flows or both (Edwards, 1999) .
From these four classifications mentioned above we may extract four dimensions (or aspects) of capital controls: the method, the direction, the range and the maturity. By referring to these four dimensions, we qualify the styles of capital controls in China in order to conduct further thorough analysis (see Table 1 ): the direct administrative controls are applied to both inflows and outflows of short-term capital flows, with generalized restrictions.
The last aspect of maturity is our priority of study and some evidences based on it are presented in the section 5.
Mechanism of Capital controls in China
Replacing the "all-included" foreign exchange management system, the framework of capital controls in China has been transformed into an administrated regime which consists of three pillars: controls over foreign direct investment, over international portfolio investment, and over foreign debts.
Controls over Foreign Direct Investment (FDI):
As China's capital control regime discriminates cross-border flows among different capital accounts. 5 We begin with those that are less regulated and those relating to capital flows in the long term. Relaxation of control on FDI inflows to China has been implemented long time ago and welcoming FDI a long-held policy; there has also the most mobile cross-border financial transactions in this account. At present, there is no restriction on direct investment in China for foreign investors provided they follow the guidance of industrial policies set 5 Controls on the capital accounts apply only to about a quarter of the IMF categories (Prasad and Wei, 2005) .
by the Government. And for the management of foreign exchange associated with FDI inflows, there are no restrictions on repatriations of funds (and/or profits) and associated trade credit. 6 Emphasis on the settled amount of investment funds, on foreign currencies expenditure and revenue classified as transactions in the capital account, and on foreign borrowing by companies with FDI are replaced by the government's concern of FDI outflows. Precisely, direct investment overseas by Chinese entities must be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Cooperation. The origins of their own funds in the form of foreign currencies and the risks associated with overseas investments should be verified and evaluated by the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) in which remittances must be also registered.
The purchase of foreign currency from the SAFE can be carried out for major strategic projects approved by the State. Figure 1 shows the evolution of FDI flows in two directions under controls.
This structure of control, encouraging the entry of foreign capital and limiting the domestic capital outflows, coupled with other priority policies for foreign investors, reflects China's strategy of financial openness: on one hand transferring technology and modern managerial skills through attracting FDI, and on the other hand obtaining foreign currency (Gao, 2000 ).
Controls over International Portfolio Investment
The liberalization of financial markets is an inevitable phase for a country in transition like China. But provided the problems caused by hasty opening of stock markets in several emerging markets, Chinese authorities still keep cautious in this field.
First, allowing foreign investors to invest into Chinese stock markets at the same time limiting it with certain degree, Chinese authorities have implemented two main measures: the segmentation of the stock market and the overseas listing of Chinese companies. 7 As for the former, the segmentation has existed since the first B share issued by Shanghai Vacuum Electronic Devices and Company and listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1992. Until the end of August 2008, 114 Chinese companies have issued B shares, 89 of which have issued both A share and B share. In addition to the former one that consists of the origins of capital flows into stock markets in China, the latter is another channel for transferring foreign capital into China, however subjected to less stringent constraints. Once the approval is obtained from China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), Chinese firms may be financed with foreign exchange by listing overseas. The only restrictions come from the fact that the foreign currency received abroad should be repatriated under a time limit. According to the CSRC, until the end of May 2008, (New York, London, Singapore, Hong Kong), there are 150 Chinese companies listed in foreign stock exchanges, 38 of which are listed both in 6 These cross-border flows have the potential to arbitrage onshore and offshore yield. 7 China's stock market is segmented into two markets: A share market, where stock is denominated and subscribed in local currency RMB, accessible to Chinese nationals and 65 (number updated to the end of August 2008) qualified foreign institutional investors (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors, or QFII), and B share market, where stock is subscribed in foreign currencies (Hong Kong dollar for stocks listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange and U.S. dollar for stocks listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange), is for non-qualified foreign investors.
mainland China and Hong Kong, 5 of which in both Hong Kong and London, 13 of which in both Hong Kong and New York. The listing in foreign stock Exchanges is already considered as a main window of capital accounts opening and as an important channel promoting the reform in large state-owned companies of China.
As for capital outflows in form of securities investment, i.e. the purchase of foreign stocks by Chinese households and the listing of foreign companies onshore along with their sales of shares in Chinese stock markets, there are certain restrictions on them, except for those approved by the CSRC, the SAFE etc. The first type is a priori prohibited. At the same time, the collection of funds denominated in foreign currencies must be financed by investors themselves and the transfer of funds be approved by the SAFE. The second is not permitted either with the exception for the sales of B shares acquired by foreign investors.
Contrary to investment in the stock markets, the China's bond market is relatively closed to foreign investors who are prohibited to buy and sell bonds and other debt instruments, which are the sources of inflows and outflows, except for the 'qualified investors' whose main transfer of principals are nevertheless under the quantity control, maximal 20% every three months after staying at least 3 years in China. Since the end of 2004, the issuance of bonds, only denominated in RMB, is permitted for some international financial institutions with nature of global development, but the conditions are still relatively strict. Organizations to be approved must have previously funded Chinese companies with an amount of at least one billion U.S. dollars; and their RMB -denominated bonds should have a rating higher than AA. Furthermore, raised funds should be used only for national projects in China.
Meanwhile, investment in foreign bond markets by Chinese residents is not allowed either.
The only exceptions are commercial banks, authorized and delegated by the central bank of China, and insurance companies by the Chinese Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC).
But they can invest only with their own foreign currencies. These controls refer to that of domestic capital outflows. As to capital inflows from this channel, the issuance of bonds abroad of Chinese entities needs the approval of the Central Bank of China (PBOC) and the SAFE where the amount is recorded and included in the National plan of foreign debt. The raised funds should be as well repatriated to China within a certain time limit set by the Chinese authorities.
Controls over foreign debts:
These controls aim to make the external debt increase compatible with that of domestic investment, government budget and current accounts, at the meantime assuring the effectiveness of monetary policies (Shinji and Shi, 2005) .
The management of foreign debts, a part of which previously mentioned as controls over the issuance of bonds abroad being virtually a component of portfolio investment according to the international standard, also refers to the debt of governments, financial institutions and Chinese companies, both in long and/or short term, with foreign governments, international organizations, international banks, and foreign companies and individuals. There is also trade-related credit. The structure of the management of foreign debts is presented in the Table2. The method of controls refers to the size, structure, maturity and repayment of debts. The approval and registration in the national plan are required. When domestic entities (financial institutions or companies) borrow from foreigners, it is necessary for them to obtain a license as qualified debtors and the amount of indebtedness expected should be approved by certain authorities. Moreover, the conditions of borrowing have to be satisfied and reimbursement of debt approved by the SAFE. The transfer of received funds in foreign currency into China is required within a fixed period of time (See Figure 1) . But for companies with FDI, simply register in SAFE is sufficient in order to obtain credit for non residents. The loan granting to foreign institutions by domestic ones is subject to the constraint of delegation given by the PBOC. In the case of deferment of debt, the restrictions become more stringent: This deferment is not permitted unless it conforms to the rules for the management of assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency, approved by the authorities and registered in SAFE respectively before and after this operation. Creditor institutions should firstly use their own funds to provide foreign currency loans. If credit amount exceeds certain threshold, the difference requires the approval of SAFE. For domestic companies or non-financial institutions, granting such loans is forbidden. Figure 1) . At that time, the authorities once intended to rapidly achieve full liberalization of capital accounts, but since the Asian crisis of 1997, there had been relatively little progress and no concrete action either. According to Chinese authorities, they do consider capital accounts liberation in the medium term.
In this perspective, there had been no further measures only until December 2002 when the Chinese government announced the QFII scheme, some measures of which have already been mentioned previously. We could see a cautious attitude of Chinese government towards the capital accounts opening to the extent that it made an attempt to relax controls on the entry of capital before permitting the national capital exit, i.e. the FDI overseas since several years ago. indirectly the fact that RMB is under immense pressure of appreciation facing proliferated expansion of foreign exchange reserves, rather than strong motivations for opening capital accounts. 8 The QDII scheme allows at least partially to absorb a portion of foreign exchange reserves and to ease appreciation tension of Chinese currency, with the effect to be proven.
Recent deregulations
In May 2007, the scope of QDII is further extended by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). Therefore, banks are allowed to offer equity-related instruments under certain restrictions: The net amount invested in the shares of a "QDII" product should not exceed 50% of the total value, with net amount of a single action topped out at 5%. The minimum of agreement for each customer is 300 thousand yuan (around 30 thousand euro).
In addition, the invested actions or relevant funds should be registered or approved by the foreign regulatory institutions which have signed agreement memorandums with CBRC. This enlargement is also thought as a way to cool the overheating A-share stock market when the authorities worry about explosion of bubble. 
Recent strengthening:
Since July 2008, the Chinese government has clearly strengthened the supervision and management on international payments, especially to prevent the entry of ' hot money ' via the channels of trade, FDI and RMB-denominated accounts of non-residents. According to the recently amended version of the "Regulations on the Foreign Exchange System of the People's Republic of China", the SAFE is given the right to monitor and apply some process of controls on capital inflows and outflow. We deduce that avoiding sudden capital outflows could be the next challenge for management of capital account.
•
Trade channel: on one side, the deposit or sale of foreign currency-denominated revenue by exporters is subject to verifications from SAFE, the Ministry of Commerce, and
Chinese customs, the advances in exports and the deferred payment for import by the SAFE on the other side.
• FDI channel: In July 2008 the Chinese government has issued a circular to prevent the abnormal capital inflows via this channel. 9 Meanwhile, the SAFE has warned commercial banks in terms of foreign currencies payments of FDI-companies' equity. What is highlighted includes the use of funds of equity converted into RMB, which should be approved by the government. Unless otherwise specified, the funds are forbidden to invest in the Chinese stock market. Furthermore, with the exception of foreign real estate enterprises, companies with FDI will not be allowed to buy real estate in China for non-operating usage with their funds converted into RMB. Obviously, the government aims to filter the unidentified capital inflows (hot money) through the FDI channel, whose real purpose is to speculate in the stock and real estate markets.
• Channel of RMB-denominated account of foreigners: the SAFE has announced several regulations on "the data submission of RMB positions of non-residents" to strengthen the supervision and control on eight categories of RMB-denominated accounts of non-residents. According to this theorem, the interest differential between two assets, identical in every aspect except currency of denomination, should be zero once allowance is made for cover in the forward exchange. Deviations from the CIP condition would reflect transactions costs (Frankel, 1992 ). 11 For non-comparable assets (i.e., assets issued in different political 9 Circular on Further Strengthening and Regulating the Administration of Foreign Investment Projects. 10 Other methods to define capital mobility includes Feldstein-Horioka definition (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980) , real interest parity, uncovered interest parity (Frankel, 1993 (Frankel, , 1992 .
11 Transaction cost in broad sense. Studies in the literature attempted to rationalize this departures in terms of transactions costs (Branson, 1969; Frenkel and Levich, 1975, 1977) ; capital market imperfection (Prachowny, 1970; Frenkel, 1973) ; capital controls (Frankel, 1993; Otani and Tiwari, 1981) ; data imperfection or mismatch (Taylor, 1987 (Taylor, , 1989 
Quantifying the interest yield differential from covered interest parity
If covered parity condition holds, it means that international capital movement is free from capital controls, so we have:
where F is the forward rate for a given maturity, S is the spot rate (domestic price of foreign currency), R is the interest rate of the home currency, and R F is the foreign interest rate.
When the capital controls bind, non-residents may not have full access to onshore monetary market; or when onshore forward exchange market does not exist or the existing one is not well developed, non-residents cannot make use of the forward exchange contracts to cover the exchange rate risk exposure of their onshore portfolios, giving rising to the Non Deliverable Forward (NDF) contract. 13 With this financial instrument, a gain equivalent to that of euro-currency deposit, which does not exist for most of the countries having offshore NDF markets, can be obtained. Assume that the offshore NDF market, which is considered as a benchmark market, is very active and the CIP holds there, we have:
where i is the NDF-implied yield rate of the home currency offshore. To the extend that the arbitrage between the onshore money market and offshore NDF market is effectively constrained by capital controls, the NDF-implied offshore interest rate, i, can differ considerable from the interest rate prevailing in the onshore money market, R. This yield differentials (or spread) can be written as:
A large and persistent onshore/offshore spread Y indicates the presence of effective crossborder restrictions. 14 Moreover, a positive sign of the yield gap imply appreciation pressures on the home currency in the presence of capital controls and vice versa (Ma and McCauley, 2008 ).
If we assure that, on the offshore market, the transaction cost of interest arbitrage is non-negligible, we can write it as π, and rewrite the equation (3):
Y consists of the pure transaction costs of arbitrage and the yield differentials of Ma and
McCauley (2008) which represents only capital controls. This is the variable of interest that we will calculate and model hereafter. We continue to call it yield differential or deviation from CIP because of the inclusion of the transaction cost π.
As to the empirical approaches relevant to our deviation from CIP, here we only consider those of univariate analysis which study the behavior and the dynamics of π, which is more consistent with our question. 15 Within this branch, we distinguish three mains methods: the net US dollar is settled with a compensating payment made or due based upon the difference between the NDF contract rate and the exchange rate prevailing at maturity. For more information on NDF contract refer to the Foreign Exchange Committee website (http://www.newyorkfed.org/fxc/) and the EMTA website (http://www.emta.org/). For recent development of Asian NDF markets refer to (Ma et al., 2004 ).
14 Alternative way to investigate the effect of capital controls is to calculate the price differential of exchange rate of RMB from covered interest parity: assume that the interest rate of RMB offshore is the same as in China domestic monetary market. If the CIP holds in the offshore market, we can derive an offshore spot exchange rate (with equation (1)) which should be equal to the quoted rate in the market. A eventual persistent different of this rate imply the segmented foreign exchange market due to the capitals controls or deviation of currency from its current equilibrium. In fact, this approach aims to verify the law of one price for the external value of the RMB, while the ours focus on the difference of its internal value.
15 Accordingly, the approaches with multivariate analysis we called here refer to the studies using regression first type relies on computing actual deviations from interest parity (see, e.g., Frenkel and Levich, 1975) ; the second type involves the stationary or unit root analysis of the deviation from CIP (see, e.g., Holmes, 2001 
where
, here ρ in could be restricted to zero, and ρ out is the convergence speed outside the thresholds of arbitrage (or inaction). 16 Higher convergence speeds reflect a quicker convergence to CIP and hence stronger financial integration. 17 By estimating a band-TAR model, Peel and Taylor (2002) supported the conjecture of Keynes and Einzig (Einzig, 1937; Keynes, 1923 ) that deviations from CIP in the interwar period did not tend to be arbitraged at all until they were of the order of fifty basis points.
18 For a brief discussion of theoretical and empirical motivations of this class of model, see, e.g., Hansen (1999) . 19 A standard model with transportation costs implies that real exchange rates should follow a band threshold model where the process is a random walk within the band and mean-reversion outside it. 20 Levy Yeyati et al. (2009) estimate an augmented Band-TAR model with generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH) effect for the cross-market premium of stock price to test the law of one price, and to shed some light on the international financial integration and effectiveness of capital controls during some periods.
As showed in Figure 6, 
where 1 in (1 out ) is the indicator function and equals to 1 when y t−1 < c up (y t−1 ≥ c up ) and 0 otherwise. In this specified TAR(2,k,d) model, 2 is the number of regimes, k is the augmented lag length, and d is the delay parameter. As we will show later, we divide our sample into three sub-periods since the structural change and the outbreak of the financial crisis are represented in our data, and set k to 0 or 1 to correct the autocorrelation in the residuals. d is set to 1 for all sub-samples. ρ in and ρ out represent the convergence speed in the no-arbitrage and arbitrage regime, respectively. 22 Moreover, we assume the same error terms and conditional variance for both of the two regimes. 23 The number of ARCH and GARCH terms (p and q) could be specified differently for each sub-sample. Generally, a GARCH(1,1) is sufficient for each sub-sample to take into account the heteroskedasticity. 24 We estimate the outlined model by following the procedure described in Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) : to estimate via a grid search on the threshold variable which maximizes the
with L a (L n ) being the log likelihood of the alternative TAR model (null AR model). 25 The likelihood function of the above TAR can be written as: 
Data
Our To ensure an adequate number of observation on each side of the threshold (or in each threshold space), here we exclude the highest and the lowest 15% of the threshold variable from the grid search, as widely did in practice. 26 For example, 600 simulation are generated for the fitted model. Then start each simulation with y −b = 0, end at y T , and discard the first b (set to 50) to avoid the initial value bias. And then estimate a TAR model as described above for each simulation and calculate the corresponding simulated LLR. 27 Instead of supposing other possible forms of distribution, such as the Student-t distribution, the Generalized Error distribution (GED) and the skewed-Student distribution. 28 For the reason to choose these proxies and for a detailed description of their characteristics, see, e.g., Ma and McCauley (2008) . 
Result and discussions
These yield differentials are calculated with equation (3'), and plotted in Figure 6 . The substantial and persistent RMB yield differential would, a priori, indicate large transactions costs and the implied effectiveness of capital controls. 30 Concerning the speed of reversion to "equilibrium", we rely on a TAR model with upper threshold as described above. Before presenting the results of estimation, we implement some preliminary analysis.
Unit Root (UR) Analysis
If the yield differentials have a unit root, it indicates that these deviations are persistent and not mean-reverting, meaning the effective capital controls; while the stationary characteristics represents a process of returning to equilibrium level, via the activity of arbitrage in the market. Furthermore, the speed of the convergence can be calculated by estimating The two RU tests are applied to the whole sample and also to each sub-sample, with the results reported in Table 6 . No surprisingly, for the whole sample, both of them fail to reject the RU null, since the power of the tests become lower facing the structural changes. To adequately model and carefully investigate the series of the yield differentials, we also apply these two tests to each sub-sample, respectively, instead of using a UR test with structural changes (breaks). 33 The results, this time, do not always give the same evidence: the NP 29 However, several authors have doubts on the real effect of this change (See, e.g., Goldstein and Lardy, 2006).
30 Table 3 summarizes the means and t-statistics of the measured yield differentials for different sub-periods. 31 For the low power of traditional tests of unit-roots in the presence of asymmetric adjustment, see, e.g., Enders and Granger (1998 test can not rejected the UR null for either of the three sub-periods (see Table 6 ), implying the absence of the mean reverting of yield differential, while the M-TAR test only accepts the UR for the third sub-period. Based on the results of M-TAR test, during the first two sub-periods, the yield differentials are stationary but nonlinear. As to the third one (the period the financial turbulence), even with the same conclusion of the two tests, we accept the non-stationarity of the yield differential with caution. 34 However, what is unclear is the reason of this violation of interest rate parity: is it the liquidity risk or the strengthening of the capital controls or even both (see Figure 3 , 4)? We will provide an answer at the end of this section.
AR v.s.TAR
We have justified our choice of TAR model with theoretical arguments, and now we try to present the empirical justification. Could we reject the linearity? To answer this question, we apply several widely used linearity tests: the BDS test (Brock et al., 1987 (Brock et al., , 1996 , the F-test of Tsay (1989) and the sup-LM test of Hansen (1996) . Since they assume that the series are independently and identically distributed (iid), we build an AR(p) model for each sub-sample to assure that the residuals contain no serial correlation. Because the heteroskedasticity is prevalent in our series as is common for high frequency financial data, we refine our model by adding the GARCH effect, leading to the homoskedastic standardized residual. Then we check the linearity of the standardized residual by using the aforementioned linearity tests. 35 Specified models and their estimated coefficients are presented in Table 5 and the results of linearity tests in Table 6 .
As these results do not allow us to obtain unambiguous inference, we provide some possible explanations. On one hand, as opposed to our expectation, the linearity can not be rejected in the most cases; BDS test reports, only for the third period, the nonlinearity that itself can not be proved as the specific TAR form. In other words, the TAR alternative may be misspecified since the threshold nonlinearity disappear once the GARCH effect has been taken into account. On the other hand, fail to reject the linearity may be related to the estimated coefficients of the conditional variance terms (see the coefficients of variance equation reported in Table 5 ). The sum of α 1 and λ 1 superior to 1, indicates the non-stationarity in volatility which may affect the consistency, convergence rates and asymptotic distributions of the coefficients. 36 Based on these facts, non-rejection of linearity, non-stationarity of the an earlier version, the break was found at the period of reform via the UR test of Perron (1997) in which the timing of the single break is endogenous. 34 The results of Choi and Moh (2007) also indicate that the often claimed "unit-root first, nonlinearity second" approach will be of reduced merit when the associated AR parameters take large values which makes challenging for the extant technical devices to detect stationary of processes with high AR parameter regardless of linearity. They suggest that what determines the power of unit-root tests is not the specific type of nonlinearity in the alternative model, but how far the alternative model is away from the unit-root process. The procedure proposed by Harvey and Leybourne (2007) provides an alternative of testing the linearity before the checking of UR. 35 To have correct size, BDS test is applied to logarithm of squared standardized residuals, instead of standardized ones (see, e.g., de Lima, 1996) . 36 Petrucelli and Woolford (1984) show that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the stationarity of δyt−1 is: ρ in < 0,ρ out < 0 and (1 + ρ in )(1 + ρ out ) < 0 for any value of c. In our case, the ARCH and the GARCH effect are significant for all sub-samples, while the volatility is stationary only in the second volatility in linear autoregressive model and the absent of an powerful specification test for discerning the competing models, we focus on the specified TAR model and take its linear counterpart for comparison.
Following the method described in subsection 4.3, we estimate the threshold and the TAR model using the same specification as to the AR-GARCH model. Then some restrictions are imposed according to significance of estimated coefficients. The results are reported in Table   7 .
We discuss the results of estimation for each sub-periods. Before the peg regime of RMB has been abandoned in July 2005, the threshold estimated is about 200 base points, which approximates its unconditional mean (367 points, see Table 3 Here we try to give some possible explanations for the increased threshold and the far shortened HL. On one side, the higher threshold implies that for this sub-period as a whole, the capital controls are still binding; and that the extent of controls are strengthened. This is mainly due to some policy measures introduced later in this sub-period to stem the shortterm cross-border flows. This result is consistent with the explanation that for the initial episode of the new regime, the narrowing of the onshore and offshore RMB yield differential is a chosen outcome of policy rather than as a waning effectiveness of the capital controls interpreted by market observers (see Ma and McCauley, 2008) , which is used to interpret the much lowered unconditional mean after the regime change. On the other side, the quick mean-reverting process (or a shorter HL) implies that once the unexploited profit appears and exceeds the transaction costs and risk associated to capital controls, the active arbitrage funds take the risks and assume the costs to obtain the excessive part of the profit, even the capital controls are binding. This action reduce quickly the yield differential to the level of the threshold. If the capital controls can be bypassed, This to some extent the ineffectiveness sub-sample.
of the restrictions and triggered the strengthening of theme by the Chinese government.
Capital control and Financial crisis
Entering into the period of turbulence, the spiral upwards and downwards of yield differential could not be totally explained by the eventual strengthening of capital controls of the Chinese government. A glance at the countries with highly financial integration ( Figure 3 ) and some Asian economies with NDF markets (Figure 4 and Table 8 ) reveals some common factor(s) of abnormal behavior of the yield differentials.
In this context, it is implicitly assumed that the effects of the financial turmoil on the evolution of yield differentials can be represented by a few (or even one) latent common factors F , e.g., the liquidity risk. 37 Here we use the principal component approach to estimate this latent factor for six Asian economies having NDF market. 38, 39 Then, we regress the raw data of yield differential of third period over the first factor that we assume to be the variations (of transaction cost) triggered by liquidity risk attributed to the financial crisis.
The residual net of this principal component is the "deflated series" with which we estimate the alternatives models and implement the hypothesis testing.
This corrected yield differentials are plotted in Figure 6 , accompanied by the whole sample raw data. The volatility (the standard deviation) is largely reduced to the half of that derived from the original data (see also last line of Table 3 ), but still higher than the tranquil sub-periods (the first two). However, during the period of turbulence, the yield differentials are mean-reverting, supported by both of the UR tests (see last line of Table   6 ). An HL of about 13 days (slightly shorter than the second sub-period) confirm this result, even the estimated AR model with GARCH effect reports a non-stationary volatility. Contrasted with the model specified with original data, the HL are much more shortened once the volatility are deflated. In other words, when we include the liquidity risk premium as an additional transactions costs when liquidity declines, incurred extra volatility make the mean-reverting process much slower, and consequently, creates an illusion that the longer HL results from the tighter and more effective capital controls. Our TAR model gives the different results: the threshold has increased by 80 base points (see Table 7 ) and the HL (about 4.6 days) sightly extended, indicating that the extent of the capital control has been strengthened by the Chinese government. For instance, in August 2008, the issued regulation requires the companies with FDI to submit their reports on the verification of capital denominated in foreign currency, aiming to limit the inflows of hot money via the aforementioned FDI channels. As to the HL, whatever estimated by AR or TAR model, it changes only slightly relative to that of the second sub-period, implying that the market are more and gradually integrated with the new currency regime, even maybe 37 As to a further investigation of the possible economic determinants of this common "crisis" factor, it is out of scope of this paper. The liquidity risk is identified as one main factor of the soar of transaction costs in the financial market during the period of financial crisis (see, e.g., Baba and Packer, 2009; Levy Yeyati et al., 2009). 38 China mainland (CNY), Indonesia (IDR), India (INR), Philippines (PHP), South Korea (KRW) and Taiwan (TWD), with the abbreviation of their currency in parenthesis. 39 The results are reported in Table 11 ; Alternative way to estimate the latent common factor is to use a dynamic factor model based on Kalman filtering, this could be an extension of this version. Through examining the gross cross-border flows (via the current and capital accounts) in China, Ma and McCauley (2008) conclude that the large and growing size of cross-border would suggest limited effectiveness of capital controls or leaky capital account in China, and it is the capital account flows increasing quickly and gaining relative importance, especially the non-FDI capital flows (hot money). 40 They identify the channels through which hot money flows into China: the current receipts and payments in the current accounts; domestic banks' lending and/or borrowing with their overseas counterparts under other investment terms of capital accounts, and unrecorded flows in the errors and omission terms. 41 As they mentioned, the intensity of capital controls over different types of capital flows may vary and consequently capital flows differ among these categories or sub-categories of capital account, it is not obvious to access directly if the capital controls are effective. In order to circumvent this difficulty, we try to obtain some evidence from another angle. As one major purpose of capital control is shaping size and composition of capital flows, effective capital control should be justified if this goal could be achieved. As mentioned "at present, appropriate action should be taken to encourage inflow of long-term capital while short-term capital inflows and capital flight need to be restricted". It implies that if the capital control policy is effective, the composition of the capital inflows evolves in favor of long-term inflow and capital flight will be minimized. In this part, we focus on these two points to find some evidence of effectiveness of controls.
Measuring of long-term (short-term) cross-border Capital flows
According to their nature or functions, capital flows (CAP) basically consist of foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity and other investment, including commercial lending and official debt flows. 42 But here we focus on their maturities and investigate capital flows components by using 3 proxies: total normal capital flows (hereafter TNORM), short-term 40 These so-called "hot money" aims to pursue onshore yield differential between RMB and foreign denominated deposit, or to bet on the RMB appreciation. 41 In order to accommodate decisions of onshore non-bank depositors and borrowers (Chinese households and firms) in foreign currency. 42 We begin by examining the total normal capital flow for the total 1982-2007 period (excluding year 2000), China has registered an annual average of 22504 million dollars (inflow), net total flows of normal capital add up with the increasing sub-period averages to a very high net volume of capital inflows of 563 billion USD (Table 9) . 47 This fact results mainly from the huge and continual long-term capital inflows with an accelerating pace, averaging approximately 25706 million USD in the entire sample period (see Table 9 ).
This result is consistent with Chinese government capital control policy: facilitating the long-run capital flows into China. On the contrary, the short-term capital outflows are concentrated for the period 1982-1999, reaching the peak during the Asian financial crisis period. inflow of long-term capital and moderate short-term outflows and inflows according to the circumstances can be explained as follows: on one hand, strong economic growth dynamics of China after economic opening and especially the enter into WTO will brings higher rate of return of capital than other emerging markets for the long-term investments; on the other hand, greater exposure to the exchange rate risk resulting from the lack of hedging instruments in the foreign exchange market, and exposure to political risk coming from the perspective of capital control lead to short-term outflows, speculative expectation of revaluation or devaluation related to the less flexible exchange rate regime incur short-term inflows and outflows. However, the net short-term flows have been less volatile than long-term and total normal capital flows in the entire sample period and also in the every sub-period (see Table 9 , the standard error in the parentheses). 48 One simple possible explication of this limited volatility is the effective capital control on gross flows. will examine another indicator as mentioned above: the composition of capital flows.
•
Composition of gross capital inflows
Following Edwards (1999) , who showed some evidence of Chile's capital control effectiveness and based on this criterion, we are the first who calculate the long-short term inflows composition of China, with the short-term flows having less than one year maturity. 49 Due to the fact that gross short-term flows and long-term flows exist only for 1982-1997, inflows for other years are calculated in the same way as for net long and short-term flows cited above, only by substituting the inflows (in credit) for the net flows (in balance). 50 The volumes and the percentages are reported in Table 10 and Figure 7 . Third, volatility of short term inflows is relatively higher except during the 1990s. In sum, these findings show more and more long-term foreign capital (especially the FDI) flows into China, whether quickly or slowly, suggesting that above mentioned policy of encouraging inflow of long-term capital has been achieved under the current regime of capital control; on the contrary, the rising share of short term capital inflows and their relatively high level during the recent years seem not conform with the purpose to restrict short term capital inflows. We still need some evidence from capital flight to complete our conclusion for effectiveness of capital controls.
Capital flight
Regardless of the sources-newly rich Chinese individuals and State-owned enterprises, there has been an increasing concern that a large portion of dramatic growth in capital inflows presented above has flowed out again in the form of capital flight (Wu, 1993; Wu and Tang, 2000) , because capital flight may contribute to an unnecessary increase in a country's foreign debt, undermine the tax, and even result in a net real capital transfer out of the country 49 One of the explicit objectives of capital control in Chile is to slow down the volume of capital flowing into the country and to tilt its composition towards longer maturities. 50 We should be cautions when interpreting the result because the Balances of Payments from 1982 to 1996 are prepared with the 4th edition of IMF BoP Manual, while those from 1997 are prepared with the 5th edition of IMF BoP Manual. Khan and Haque, 1985) . 51 According to Wu and Tang (2000) , what alarmed Beijing to action in 1998 (The advent of lots of policies of capital control is the evidence) was that foreign exchange reserves had stagnated at around 140 billion US$ in the first eight months of 1998, even though there were healthy FDI inflows and large trade surpluses. 51 A common definition is that it is composed of funds fleeing across national borders in search of sanctuary haven (Brown, 1992). 52 For examples, Balance of payments method that is credited to Cuddington, residual method , residual method based on different estimates of China's external debt (Wu and Tang, 2000) and Adjusted residual method etc. 53 They have given a though explanation of fluctuation of this residual. 54 On the contrary, this indicates again the limited controls on short-term capital flowing into China.
Concluding remarks
This paper finds that China's capital control is less effective than before facing the growing market forces in China's monetary market, and sizable and fluctuating cross-border flows, whether illegal or disguised, but still working for some goals of Chinese government, especially prevent to equalize the onshore-offshore NDF-implied interest differentials. The shrinking of onshore-offshore yield gap in the recent period indicates probably a new regime with a new trend of expectation about RMB's exchange rate, rather than the inefficacy of capital control.
Further research may be applied to China's security markets and foreign exchange market to obtain other evidences of effectiveness of capital control, or evidence of deepening of these financial markets from another angle. Whatever the field of study, if China really
attempt to further open its capital accounts and to make some concrete steps, the power or the effectiveness would be weakened for sure, at least for some purpose. We have already witnessed the impotence of capital control to withstand the financial turmoil in the West in that the impact of this financial crisis on China and his neighbor countries is channel by the real economy. This administrative control system should concede to a more flexible and market-based supervising regime which may promote a more balanced growth regime. To ensure the estimation run over the same sample for each sub-period, we fix the number of first usable observation as the sum of k-max, the times of first difference of dependent variable and 1. c When we discard the first ten points of this period (because of their abnormal behavior due to the beginning period effect of the new exchange rate regime), the power of the test is increased to 5%. Notes: The figures in squared brackets denote the number of correlations for which the Q-statistic is applied to the residuals. SR denotes standardized residual and SSR squared standardized residual. HF is the half-life calculated as ln(0.5)/ln(1 + ρ out ). * denotes the data used for this period is corrected ones. The coefficient of Asymmetric effect is significant for every sub-sample, but it is not reported here. 0.64 [20] 0.87 [20] 
